VPN Blocking in Italy's Competition Bill: When Blocking Becomes Censorship

VPN Blocking in Italy's Competition Bill: When Blocking Becomes Censorship

by Fulvio Sarzana di S. Ippolito, Attorney, Sarzana & Partners Law Firm

In short. Among the amendments to Italy's competition bill, now before the Chamber of Deputies, is VPN blocking: a block on foreign VPNs and DNS services aimed at audiovisual piracy. In Italy the blocking order comes from an administrative authority and the judge steps afterwards. The article argues that such a measure needs a precise legal basis, a judge before enforcement, targeted blocks with a way for users to defend themselves, and public lists.

Among the amendments to the competition bill (DDL competition), now before the Chamber of Deputies, is also VPN blocking: a block on foreign VPNs and DNS services against audiovisual piracy.

Prompted by this, Cristiano Ghidotti, writing in Punto Informatico, predicted a crackdown on VPNs under the pretext of hybrid warfare (in Italian).

He added that it will achieve nothing: Russia has already tried.

And in Italy, the spearhead for this kind of initiative is always copyright.

VPN blocking: what is already in the law

Law 93/2023 gave AGCOM, the Italian communications authority, the power to order within 30 minutes the blocking of domains and IP addresses that broadcast live events. The 2024 Omnibus decree extended the orders to VPN providers and public DNS providers “wherever resident and wherever located”.

AGCOM then called on these providers to register on Piracy Shield, its blocking platform, and the scope moved from football to films, series and TV.

United States and Spain: the same push

In mid-September Congressman Darrell Issa introduced the American Copyright Protection Act.

Rightsholders would obtain from a federal judge the designation of “foreign pirate site”, then a blocking order for ISPs, DNS and VPNs with at least 100,000 US users. It is backed by the MPA, the RIAA and the American Bar Association. The EFF calls it an attack on network infrastructure.

A competing text, the DEFEND IP Act by Lofgren and Tillis, excludes VPNs that offer only that service.

The 100,000-user threshold reveals the effect: it hits the large services, which generally defend themselves in court, and leaves out the small and free ones.

In Spain, on 17 February Commercial Court no. 1 of Córdoba ordered NordVPN and Proton VPN, at the request of LaLiga and Telefónica and without hearing them, to block 16 sites.

In May NordVPN won the dispute over the fines linked to those blocks.

At the end of September LaLiga asked the European Commission to include NordVPN, Proton VPN, ExpressVPN and Surfshark in the 2027 Counterfeit and Piracy Watch List.

In a 14-page document it argues that affiliate marketing guides on circumventing blocks make the providers more than neutral intermediaries, without naming a specific one.

The list has no legal effect, and the 2025 list contained no VPNs.

The effect is pressure on the providers' image.

Three legal systems, three roads: a federal judge in the United States, a commercial judge in Spain, an administrative authority in Italy, as always for the past 15 years.

Only in Italy, as always, there is no judge before the order.

Where the system does not seem to work

The report comes from the rightholder, the order from the Authority, enforcement is immediate and the hearing comes afterwards. The complaint belongs to the recipient of the order, that is, the provider. A user whose lawful content is no longer visible has nobody to turn to.

The EU Court of Justice, in UPC Telekabel, required targeted blocks and the possibility for users to assert their rights before a court. In Scarlet Extended it ruled out generalized filters.

Then there is the evidence.

With the shared IP addresses of a CDN, the administrative court (TAR) found that Cloudflare had not shown lawful use of the blocked addresses. The case is in our commentary on Piracy Shield, AGCOM and Cloudflare (in Italian).

Asking the provider to prove a negative fact, while the block has already been carried out, reverses the burden in a way that is hard to sustain.

Then there are the penalties.

The Omnibus decree punishes with up to one year's imprisonment the failure to report criminally relevant conduct.

ISPs reply that they lack the tools to establish which conduct that is.

In January 2025 the Lega party proposed exempting telecom operators, calling the penalty system disproportionate.

The truth is that the criminal mechanism overlaps with the administrative one and is run by the judiciary: it is therefore of no use for immediate deterrence at no cost.

The costs of the blocks remain with the providers, with no compensation.

Who controls whom

In 2026 the TAR annulled the AGCOM decision on age verification for adult sites, sided with Meta on the contribution owed to the Authority and suspended at 4 million euros at the end on online ticket sales (in Italian).

Russia and China: the same architecture

In Russia since 2017 VPN providers must block banned resources, otherwise they are blocked themselves. In Italy VPNs must register and carry out the blocks ordered by the Authority, with penalties if they do not.

Roskomnadzor blocked 469 VPN services at the end of February 2026, up from 258 in October 2025. In June a law banned Russian hosting companies from hosting them. In February Google was fined 22 million rubles and Apple removed more than 20 VPN apps from the Russian App Store. Advertising VPNs is banned, while use remains formally lawful. Almost 60 billion rubles are planned over three years for traffic filtering.

In China since 2017 the MIIT requires government authorization for VPN providers, including for cross-border services. The Great Firewall does the rest.

The differences exist and must be stated. In Italy there is an administrative body that obviously answers to principles of formal and substantive legality (even if it is not a judge), but the overall architecture seems to coincide: an administrative body compiles the lists, intermediaries carry them out wherever they are located, whoever does not cooperate is penalised.

Italy has already expanded the list, from the sporting event to the audiovisual catalogue. Once the infrastructure is built, extending it is a regulatory act.

The effectiveness of VPN blocking, which is absent

In Russia VPN downloads exceeded 9 million in March 2026 alone.

According to bne IntelliNews the crackdown has caused difficulties for banks, marketplaces and public services. Roskomnadzor aims for a blocking effectiveness of 92% by 2030, and meanwhile developers adapt the protocols.

In Italy, as in the United States, the obligation affects those who answer to the authority and register. Services that ignore the orders remain reachable, perhaps with more opaque protocols. The cost is paid by reputable providers and by users who use a VPN for work, for corporate security, to protect themselves on public networks.

The principle

VPN blocking affects the privacy tools used by millions of people: it requires a precise legal basis, a judge before enforcement, targeted blocks with a way for users to defend themselves, and public lists.

Without these safeguards, copyright is protected by sacrificing the freedom to communicate of people who have done nothing wrong.

Frequently asked questions on VPN blocking

What does VPN blocking in Italy's competition bill involve?

Among the amendments to the competition bill, now before the Chamber of Deputies, is a block on foreign VPNs and DNS services aimed at audiovisual piracy.

What is already in Italian law on anti-piracy blocking?

Law 93/2023 gave AGCOM the power to order within 30 minutes the blocking of domains and IP addresses that broadcast live events. The 2024 Omnibus decree extended the orders to VPN providers and public DNS providers wherever resident and wherever located. AGCOM called on them to register on Piracy Shield, and the scope moved from football to films, series and TV.

How do blocking orders work in the United States and Spain?

In the United States the proposed American Copyright Protection Act, introduced by Congressman Darrell Issa, provides for a blocking order obtained from a federal judge. In Spain a commercial court in Córdoba ordered NordVPN and Proton VPN to block 16 sites. In Italy an administrative authority issues the order and the judge comes afterwards.

Is VPN blocking effective?

According to the article, no. In Russia, despite the blocking of 469 VPN services at the end of February 2026, VPN downloads exceeded 9 million in March 2026 alone. The cost falls on providers that answer to the authority and on users who use a VPN for work, corporate security or public networks.

Who can challenge an AGCOM blocking order?

The complaint belongs to the recipient of the order, that is, the provider. A user whose lawful content is no longer visible has nobody to turn to. The EU Court of Justice, in UPC Telekabel, required targeted blocks and the possibility for users to assert their rights before a court.

What safeguards does VPN blocking need?

A precise legal basis, a judge before enforcement, targeted blocks with a way for users to defend themselves, and public lists. Without them, copyright is protected by sacrificing the freedom to communicate of people who have done nothing wrong.

A first version of this article was published on 15 November 2026 on Fulvio Sarzana's blog at Il Sole 24 Ore (in Italian).

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